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Predicting the future is an integral part of effective corporate decision making. Most firms face the
critical challenge of aggregating information dispersed among its agents. These agents and thus the
aggregation process are prone to judgmental biases. The primary research question we address is
whether markets correct these biases better than group deliberations. Using an experimental setting,
we find that information markets provide more accurate and less volatile forecasts than group
deliberations. We also describe different sources of the behavioral biases we observe. For example,
while a deliberating group can be led astray by an influential group member, traders tend to
overweight personal preferences. Our results indicate that conditional prediction markets provide a
more effective medium for aggregating information than group deliberations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Predicting the future is an integral part of effective corporate decision
making. Most firms face the critical challenge of aggregating information
dispersed among its agents. As opposed to estimating the value or likelihood of
some future event that will be verifiable with certainty, prediction markets can
also be used to evaluate alternatives that may never materialize. The literature
often refers to these markets as conditional markets. Hanson (1999) argues that
conditional prediction markets could be used to directly guide decision making
because theycan“accuratelyestimate the consequencesof importantdecisions”.
The value of information markets to any firm depends on their direct
comparison with existing information aggregation mechanisms. Several studies
have compared the predictive power of markets with traditional mechanisms.
Empirical studies have compared information markets to in-house experts
(e.g. Chen and Plott (2002)), independent forecasting agencies (e.g.Wolfers and
Zitzewitz (2004)), Delphi techniques (Berg and Rietz (2007)) and opinion polls
(Berg et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2005)). However, in many corporations the
most relevant benchmark is arguably group deliberation. To our knowledge, this
is the first study to compare prediction markets to this most widely used
mechanism in the business world – found mostly in its form of the ubiquitous
business meeting.1
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Besides its widespread use, there is another reason why group deliberation
represents an interesting benchmark for prediction markets. While statistical
groups and individuals are fundamentally different from market mechanisms,
group deliberation has, at least in theory, the ability to replicate an efficient
market. It involvesmultiple participantswho exchange information and can thus
update their priors to arrive at a consensus. Designed correctly, prediction
markets candirectly guidedecisionmaking.Theyarenot limited toactual events,
but can also evaluate conditional probabilities toprovide amore informedpicture
of hypothetical future states of theworld. In that sense, thesemarkets are capable
of assessing complex situations, a task traditionally reserved for deliberation.
Although the notionof informationally efficientmarkets assumes individual
rationality, there are many studies which challenge this assumption. In light of
these challenges, we address the following research question: Do markets
correct behavioral biases better than group deliberations?
II. BEHAVIORAL BIASES IN GROUP DELIBERATIONS AND
INFORMATION MARKETS
Both markets and group deliberations are composed of individuals. Much
of economic theory is based on the notion that market participants act
rationally and make utility optimizing decisions. This assumption has been
questioned by numerous observations of behavioral biases.2 Studies argue for
the presence of behavioral biases in economic agents. For instance, (i) people
are overconfident in their judgment and abilities (e.g. Russo and Shoemaker
(1989)), (ii) individuals tend to overweight recent information and overreact to
it (Tversky and Kahneman (1981)), and (iii) individual preferences depend on
the way in which choices and outcomes are framed. Additional biases include
forecasting error, regret avoidance and herding, and personal preferences.
The underlying assumption of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH)
that markets fully and accurately reflect all available information appears
unrealistic given a plethora of behavioral biases. For instance, evidence for
continuing market inefficiencies can be found in the countless financial
bubbles throughout history ranging from the tulip mania that swept through
Holland in the 17th century to the US technology bubble in 2000. A variety of
biases can help explain those inefficiencies.
One example of a behavioral bias is overconfidence. People are more
optimistic about their own future than that of others (Weinstein (1980)). There
are many other examples of behavioral biases. Most people overreact to
unexpected and overweight anecdotal, recent information, a bias that is closely
related to representativeness heuristics. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) have
concluded that thisbehavior affects stockprices. It has alsobeen found that regret
avoidance may influence investment decisions and lead to suboptimal
performance (Clarke et al. (1994)). Studies have also indicated that traders
may trade according to their personal preferences as opposed to objective
probability assessments. Surveys at the IowaElectionsMarket (IEM)have found
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traders to be biased by their party preference and this bias appears to be reflected
in both their trading activity and their portfolio holdings (Forsythe et al. (1999)).
Despite the encouraging evidence supporting the benefit of prediction markets
such behavioral biases may limit their effectiveness.
In firms, group deliberation remains one of the most widely used
mechanisms to collect and aggregate information. Presumably business
meetings and committees lead to better informed decisions. But there are a
number of concerns regarding group deliberations and the fact that both
practitioners and academics are continuously developing methods to better
aggregate information shows that they are aware of certain failures within
standard group discussions. Possible sources of deficiency in groupdeliberation
include informational influences and social pressures. Informational influences
arise due to failure of group members to disclose information because a public
announcement by others has made them uncertain of their own beliefs.
Examples include groupthink (Janis (1982)), overconfidence, polarization
(Brown (1965)) and information cascades (Anderson and Holt (1997)). In the
case of social pressures, people silence themselves for fear of disapproval from
other group members even though they think that their information or belief is
better. These pressures are also known as cost-benefit trade-offs, reputational
cascades (Sunstein (2006)) and conformity (Asch (1963)).
A comparison of prediction markets and group deliberation must primarily
focus on their ability to address these biases. Under the rational expectations
hypothesis, systematic forecasting errors are impossible because they constitute
valuable information. Due to the limitations of the rational expectations
hypothesis, some alternative behavioral models of decision making have been
developed, butmost are designed to address onlyone specificbias.3The adaptive
markets hypothesis (AMH) tries to reconcile behavioral biases and efficient
markets in a more general framework. Lo (2004) argues that many of the biases
that behaviorists cite as violations of rationality and inconsistent with market
efficiency are, in fact, consistent with an evolutionary model of individuals
adapting to a changing environment. The AMH suggests that
“individuals make choices based on past experience and their
best guess [ . . . ]. They learn by receiving positive or negative
reinforcement from the outcome. [ . . . ] In this fashion,
individuals develop heuristics to solve various economic
challenges, and as long as those challenges remain stable, the
heuristics will eventually adapt to yield approximately optimal
solutions” (Lo (2004)).
Interestingly enough, the very emotions that may give rise to many behavioral
biasesmay be intertwinedwith the ability tomake rational choices. Lo concludes
that “emotions are the basis for a reward-and-punishment system that facilitates
the selection of advantageous behavior”. So the emotional feedbackmechanism
helps humans to learn. Studies have documented that human judgment tends
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to be better calibrated when people perform “repetitive tasks with fast, clear
feedback” (Odean (1998)). The arguably more focused informational input and
the finite nature of most prediction markets may even give them an edge over
financial markets and provide participants with a feedback loop which is better
suited to calibrate the traders’ judgment.
In a market environment the feedback mechanisms are not limited to
emotions, but complemented bymonetary profits. This feedbackdrives themost
influential traders tobemore rational and less prone tobehavioralbiases.Astudy
of traders at the IEM supports this notion. Oliven and Rietz (2004) find that
marginal traders are generally less biased. Price makers are those traders that
enter new limit orders to buy or sell which are later accepted by others who can
be referred to as price takers. These marginal traders who constitute roughly
15 percent of traders invest twice as much as others, trademore frequently, earn
higher returns and make only one sixth of the errors. Highly biased traders, on
theother hand, tend tobuyandhold securities. So, thedisproportionate influence
of marginal traders is one reason why markets outperform opinion pools and
polls. Thedistinctionbetweenmarginal traders andprice takers has an important
implication. It explainswhymarkets can be efficient and their prices can be used
as a predictive tool, while at the same time, behavioral biases affect themajority
of participants and can provide additional inputs to support decision making.
Group deliberations often lack this direct feedback mechanism and
provide less incentive for members to learn. Extensive empirical evidence
suggests that individuals exert less effort in groups than when alone,
a tendency known as social loafing (Ingham et al. (1974)). In addition, groups
often fail to hold individuals accountable for their contribution. Without this
feedback loop individuals are less likely to correct their errors.
Information markets however, not only correct behavioral biases through
individual feedback but also provide a superior mechanism to correct others’
biases. If an individual recognizes a judgmental error, she is rewarded for
correcting it through the pricemechanism.The fear of social sanctions is limited
because trading is mostly anonymous. Deliberative groups often fail to correct
their members’ judgmental errors, even if they could. In experiments using
questions with definite answers, deliberating groups have done only slightly
better than their average group member, but far from their best (Gigone and
Hastie (1997)). Groups have a better chance to outperform their individual
members when the outcome is verifiable (MacCoun (2002)). In group
deliberations, the cost-benefit trade-off and the desire to conformcan limit error
correction (Cannon and Edmondson (2001) and Edmondson (1996)).
Additionally, there are reasons to believe that markets provide a better
incentive system for the discovery of new information. While traders can seek
new information continuously to confirm or refute the current market prices,
the participants of group deliberations are usually “trapped” for the duration of
the deliberation round. Also participants in information markets are often
self-selected and the intensity of their beliefs is captured in the volume they
are willing to trade.
THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS2007, 1 3
192
III. EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF MARKETS AND
GROUP DELIBERATIONS
Toexamine the relativemerits of predictionmarkets andgroupdeliberations,
we develop and execute a laboratory experiment which simulates conditional
predictionmarkets. Informationmarkets and group discussions are used tomake
predictions about the success of five new product concepts for cellular phones.
The markets are conditional prediction markets with student participants
forecasting the relative future market share among these five products in the
college population. The use of informationmarkets for the evaluation of product
concepts is limited to two studies. Chan et al. (2002) introduced the idea of
securities trading of concepts (STOC) andconducted two laboratory experiments
to evaluate new product introductions for air pumps and sport utility vehicles.
Soukhoroukova and Spann (2005) have replicated this experiment design with
mp3-players.
The experiment is based on two treatments: 12 markets with trading groups
(Traders) and 12 deliberative groups (Talkers). Each group has fourmembers, so
that a total of 96 subjects participate in the experiment. The small size was also
chosen to make the markets more directly comparable to the average group
discussion.BothTraders andTalkers are assigned the taskofpredicting the future
market share among the college population of five cell phone models labeled A,
B, C, D and E.
All phones including their attributes are actual product concepts from four
different manufacturers which had not yet been released at the time of the
experiment.Prices are set close to themanufacturers’ recommended retail prices
minus a $150 to $200 discount representative of the markdown that wireless
providers usually give with the purchase of a new service contract. Figure 1
shows the salient features of the five choices.
There are various reasons for the choice of cell phones. Cell phones have a
limited number of important attributes which simplifies the decision process
and does not draw too much attention away from the forecasting task. Further,
almost every college student owns a cell phone and most have gone through
the purchasing process at least once. Many students’ cell phone purchases are
subject to behavioral biases and tend to be emotional.
Traders trade the shares of the five cell phone concepts {A, B, C, D, E}.
The value of every share is linked directly to the future market share of the
product. The payoff structure is simple. For example, a share of a phone with a
20 percent market share is worth $20.
To ensure that the tradingmechanism provides sufficient liquidity, a market
board is chosen as the trading mechanism for this experiment.4 The board
functions as amarketmaker with infinite liquidity that changes prices according
todemand.Theboard stands ready tobuyand sell securities in$1 intervals.Thus,
there is a bid-ask spread of $1 in every one of the fivemarkets. Traders can either
buy securities for the lowest possible price available on the market board or sell
securities by exchanging them for the highest possible price that the market
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board offers. By buying securities traders essentially increase the stock price by
$1. The inverse holds for security sales. The trading mechanism is thus very
similar to more complicated designs that have been created to address the thin
market problem typical for many information markets, but it is simple enough
for subjects without prior trading experience.
Since the total market share of all 5 phones is 100 percent by definition,
the value of a complete bundle of securities must be $100. Therefore, the
market maker also exchanges a complete bundle {A, B, C, D, E} for $100 at
any time and provides a unit portfolio in exchange for $100 in cash. This
operation takes place at no risk to the market board, but provides increased
flexibility for possible trading strategies. If the combined prices of {A, B, C,
D, E} exceeds $100, Traders could take advantage of this arbitrage
opportunity by buying a bundle from the board for $100 and selling it to the
market at a riskless profit. If the combined prices fell below $95, traders could
buy a bundle and sell it to the marker maker for more than what they paid for it
on the market board. Because of the bid-ask spread of $1 across 5 securities,
arbitrage opportunities only arise when prices are outside of the efficient
bounds of $95 and $100. Bundle trades could increase or decrease the supply
of shares according to demand. This also gives traders a chance to sell
securities short by buying a bundle for $100 and selling only selected shares.
Traders did take advantage of all of these trading strategies.
The Traders in each group are rotated to ensure that every participant has
an equal chance to trade. At every turn, Traders are allowed to make up to 5
trades (not considering any exchanges of complete bundles). A round is defined
as all four traders getting a chance to trade. Trading continues until no one
wants to trade anymore assuming that this would indicate an equilibrium state.
The starting prices for all five phones are set to $20 and subjects are
provided with an initial endowment of five bundles and $300 in play-money.
FIGURE 1. Product concepts underlying the experiment.
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The initial cash endowment is intended to provide sufficient liquidity to move
prices, but prevent speculative bubbles. We developed an Excel-based market
board, illustrated in Appendix B, to simplify trade execution.
The experiment is conducted in four sessions which last about 40 minutes
each. At the start, all subjects are given a questionnaire and pictures of the
phones and product attributes. Participants are informed that they are taking part
in an experimental study of prediction markets and group deliberations and
asked to individually fill out the first part of a questionnaire regarding their
personal preferences and individual market share estimates. Appendix A
contains a copy of the administered questionnaire. Subjects are informed that all
phones are actual models to be released in the near future and that the future
sales data would reveal the true market share distribution among these five
competitors. A brief introduction to the basics of prediction markets and their
use in a corporate setting is followed by an explanation of the securities used in
this experiment and the mechanism of the market board. The concepts of selling
and buying securities as well as arbitrage are illustrated with a physical market
board that resembles the software version. To provide incentives, the best
Trader in each trading group and the deliberative group with the best group
estimate are rewarded with prizes.
Participants are then randomlyassigned the role of either aTraderoraTalker.
They receive a label with a group number and a personal ID. The deliberative
groups meet in separate rooms to discussion and create consensus estimates.
A computer terminal is provided for every trading group. Traders are allowed to
communicate.
The accuracy of the predictions can only be assessed vis-a`-vis the actual
market share for the five products. Some of the phones will not be released
until the end of 2007 and even then official market data may not serve as a
reliable proxy for the relative market share due to other factors such as the
marketing campaign and the number of wireless providers offering the phone.
Therefore we conduct an independent online survey to provide a proxy for
the actual market share. We receive 134 responses from participants who are
invited by e-mail and provided with the same information as the subjects.
A simple first choice model is employed. Results of the response are reported
in Table 1. Since the margin of error is substantial, those results that use this
market share proxy as a benchmark need to be interpreted with caution.
TABLE 1
Survey results that serve as the benchmark market share estimate
A B C D E Total
First Choice 31 27 39 17 20 134
Percentage 23.1% 20.1% 29.1% 12.7% 14.9% 100%
Margin of Error (95%) 7.1% 6.8% 7.7% 5.6% 6.0%
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IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
We divide our results into three categories; Overall accuracy and
precision, behavioral biases and forecast accuracy, and market efficiency.
Overall Accuracy and Precision
All existing empirical studies that address the predictive power of
information markets have focused on measuring the accuracy of predictions,
with accuracy mostly defined as the mean or median result across multiple
observations. We propose that accuracy is only a partial measure of predictive
power and should be complemented by precision, defined as the variance of
observations. The existing prediction market research has so far failed to
recognize precision as an equally important component.
Arguably the most conspicuous attribute of a forecast is its accuracy. Both
predictionmarkets andgroupdeliberations are usedbecause theyare supposed to
improve the accuracy of individual judgment. As a statistical group, the average
of all individual subjects can serve as a reference point for both Traders and
Talkers (Figure 2).Wefind that the statistical mean of allmarket share estimates
is, indeed, close to the actual outcome. Except for phones D and Ewhich end up
beingclose together, the rankingof themodels is accurate.The estimates arewell
calibrated with respect to the actual results as can be seen from a comparison of
the benchmark (dashed line) with the line of best fit through the five estimates
(solid).
While accurateonaverage, the estimates lackprecision as evidencedby their
large standard deviations. In otherwords, asking any one of the individuals could
easily yield a very different and inaccurate picture. In most corporate settings,
average accuracyby itself is not sufficient to justifydecisions.Afirmcannot hold
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FIGURE 2. Average and standard deviation of individual estimates.
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twelve different group meetings or run twelve separate prediction markets to
ensure accuracy.Thus the variance among individual estimatesbecomescritical.
We compare the average estimate of the 12 trading and deliberative
groups, and find that both mechanisms generate an accurate prediction that is
again very close to the benchmark (Figure 3). On average, both Traders and
Talkers are able to rank all five phones correctly according to their market
share. While Traders overestimate high and underestimate low market shares,
Talkers’ estimates are slightly skewed in the opposite direction.
With respect to the variance of estimates, trading groups outperform
group discussions substantially. Group deliberation usually reduces the
variance of their members’ judgment (Brown (1965)). This appears to be the
case in this experiment, too, where the standard deviation of estimates is lower
for Talkers than for individuals. However, the direct comparison of the two
group mechanisms shows that the variation across the 12 estimates is much
lower for the Traders with an average standard deviation of 3.2 percent
compared to 7.9 percent for the Talkers.5 In fact, if one takes this variation
into account, it is clear that the 12 deliberative groups forecast all five phones
to be within one standard deviation of the average predictions. The 12 trading
groups, on the other hand, have a lower variance in their prediction. Of course,
the lower dispersion holds irrespective of the estimated benchmark.
Consideringdifferences in precision, the results across the 12 tradinggroups
are substantially better than for their deliberative counterparts.Theoverallmean
average error (MAE) of 2.87 percent and the mean average percentage error
(MAPE) of 16 percent are roughly twice as good. The average correlation
betweenmarket prices and the benchmarkmarket share is 0.83whereas it is only
0.64 for the Talkers. So while both Traders and Talkers are, on average, very
accurate in their predictions, Traders outperform Talkers in terms of precision.
One cautionary note deserves mention. The lower variation in Trader
estimates may be the result of a behavioral bias. All five shares are initially
valued at $20. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that the starting point in a
measurement process has a strong influence on the median response. This
behavioral bias is often referred to as “anchoring”. The magnitude of the most
prominent dimension of a decision object serves as a reference point for the
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FIGURE 3. Average and standard deviation of Traders’ and Talkers’ market share estimates.
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decision. Its value is modified upward or downward, but the adjustment is often
insufficient. Since the products inChan et al. (2002) had previously been used in
physical and web-based assessments of market shares, there was a direct
comparison for the market based results. In fact, the market share forecasts
deviated substantially fromprevious results and thevariations betweenproducts
were much lower in the prediction markets. This may provide further evidence
for a potential “anchoring effect” inpredictionmarketswhichcandistort results.
While, on average, both Traders and Talkers predict market shares with
high accuracy, Traders outperform Talkers both in relative and absolute terms.
Traders also exhibit a much lower variance than Talkers.
Behavioral biases and accuracy
Wehave seen that the variation of results is much greater across the Talkers
relative to the Traders. This confirms some of the limitations regarding group
deliberations mentioned previously. In most group discussions, participation
and influence are unequal. Often informal leaders emerge (Brown (1965)).
Variance can also be due to polarization where group members adopt a more
extreme version of the opinion they held prior to deliberation.
AfterTalkersfinalize theirmarket share estimates, individualsare separately
asked to name who they thought was the most talkative and influential member
in their group. Figure 4 shows the relationship between group performance and
the individual performance of the most influential group member. This analysis
only includes groups that clearly identified a most influential group member
by simple majority. The regression of the MAPE of those influencers and the
group performance indicates a positive correlation between bad judgment on
part of the influencer and an inferior group judgment.6 This relationship could
be due to an inaccurate influencer, or due to the fact that people with bad
judgment happened to be in one deliberative group. However, if we compare the
relationship between the group members’ average accuracy and the group
estimate, we find no statistically significant relationship (Figure 5). This means
y = 0.6154*x + 0.143
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FIGURE 4. Corr. of influencer and group MAPE. * Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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that while group members with bad individual estimates were able to correct
each other and maybe cancel out opposing errors, they were unable to correct
the errors of the most influential group member.
We have shown that an inaccurate and influential member of a Talker group
diminishes the accuracyof consensus forecast.Wenext examine the influence of
individual personal preferences on trading activity among Traders. Individual
traders often tend to be biased by their personal preferences. These biases may
also yield useful information in a business context. If traders at the Hollywood
StockExchange, for instance, tradeprimarily in contracts related to their favorite
movies, the portfolio holdings could allow insights into their preferences.
Transferred to this experiment, theremaybe a bias among traders to trade in their
favorite phones. Prior to trading, Traders are askedwhich phone they personally
prefer. If there is no bias in the choice of securities in which Traders trade,
subjects should be just as likely to trade in their favorite phone as they are to trade
in any of the other four. Assuming no bias, the randomchance that Tradersmake
a trade in their favorite security should be one out of five, or 20 percent.
Out of our overall sample of 985 trades, 28 percent (z-score: 6.05; p-value:
0.00) involve subjects’ favorite phones (Table 2). Thus, Traders show a
significant preference to trade in their favorite phones. Further, 68 percent of
favorite phone trades are buys. Participants are even more likely to make their
very first trade in their favorite phone (33 percent; z-score: 2.31; p-value: 0.02)
and 100 percent of first trades are decisions to buy. Conversely, trades in the least
favorite phone are below20percent, andmost of those trades aredecisions to sell.
This data supports the notion that there is a bias among traders to trade according
to their preferences.
While, we are able to confirm disproportionate trading in favorite phones,
weactuallymaybe capturingTraders’ interest inphones expected to achieve the
highest market share. There may be some overlap between the two subgroups.
Thirty-three percent (z-score: 9.80, p-value: 0.00) of all trades and 46 percent
(z-score: 4.47, p-value: 0.00) of first trades involve the phone traders
y = 0.1649x + 0.2747*
R2= 0.0073
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FIGURE 5. Corr. of MAPE and group estimate. * Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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individually forecast with the highest market share. The vast majority of those
trades are buys.
Apart from trading activity, the resulting portfolio may reveal a bias, too.
To test the portfolios in this experiment for a potential bias, we use the
following method. We construct a typical market portfolio by averaging the
number of shares that all traders hold in each of the five securities. We then
benchmark all individual portfolios against this average portfolio to see if it is
over- or underweighted with respect to a certain security. Since the chances
for any one portfolio to be over- or underweighted should be about half, we
test the portfolio composition analogous to this trading behavior.
The 48 portfolios of individual Traders do not show a statistically
significant overweighting of favorite securities. Seventy-one percent (z-score:
2.89; p-value: 0.00) of Traders did, however, underweight their least favorite
phone. There is also a tendency to overweight those models that are highest in
the individual estimates (67 percent; z-score: 2.31; p-value: 0.02) and
underweight the lowest estimate (84 percent; z-score: 3.89; p-value: 0.02).
Thus, the portfolio composition allows us to infer the traders’ least favorite
securities as well as their individual beliefs.
To what extent do individual traders update their private estimates when
they assess the value of securities? Traders may condition their beliefs on
market signals or discard their personal preferences and interpret market
information (Chan et al. (2002)). Spann and Skiera (2004) argue that
prediction markets can be used by management to identify employees with
superior forecasting ability. For this to hold there must be a relationship
between individual forecasting ability and trading success. It is also possible
that successful traders do not have superior private information, but are simply
good processors of market signals. In this experiment, the prior individual
estimate and the trading success of 48 Traders are collected. OLS estimates
TABLE 2
Trading activity by traders’ preferences and individual estimates
Favorite Least Favorite High Estimate Low Estimate
First Trades 33.3%* 16.7%* 45.8%* 0%*
0.02 0.56 0.00 0.01
Total 16 8 22 7
Buy 100% 50% 100% 29%
Sell 0% 50% 0% 71%
All Trades 27.7%* 16.6%* 32.5%* 15.7%*
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Total 273 164 320 106
Buy 68% 29% 77% 12%
Sell 32% 71% 23% 88%
*Denotes statistical significance at the the 5 percent level.
p-value in italics.
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confirm a positive relationship between a better individual estimate and
trading success measured by the final value of the portfolio (Figure 6).
To summarize our estimates of behavioral biases and consensus estimates,
Talkers can be led astray by an inaccurate but influential groupmember. Traders
showa tendency to disproportionately trade in theirmost favorite phones and are
more likely to buy than sell those securities. Traders also tend to overweight
(underweight) phones expected to garner the highest (lowest) market share in
theirfinal portfolio.Trading success canbe an indicator of individual forecasting
ability.
Market Efficiency
An efficient market incorporates all relevant information into prices. Next,
we examine equilibrium or price stabilization behavior in these experimental
markets. The results from our experiment suggest that trading patterns vary
substantially across trading groupswith the number of trades ranging from42 to
155. Some groups traded for three rounds whereas others did not reach a
conclusion until round nine. While some traders exploited the maximum
number of permitted trades in each round, others averaged only 2.6 trades per
TABLE 3
Final portfolio weighting by traders’ preferences and estimates
Favorite Least Favorite High Estimate Low Estimate
Overweight 52.1% 29.2%* 66.7%* 15.6%*
0.77 0.00 0.02 0.00
Underweight 47.9% 70.8%* 33.3%* 84.4%*
0.77 0.00 0.02 0.00
*Denotes statistical significance at the the 5 percent level.
p-values in italics.
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FIGURE 6. Individual accuracy and trading success. * Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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turn. Since none of these statistics correlate with the accuracy of the market
estimates, we can exclude them as factors for efficient information aggregation.
In an efficient market, investors cannot systematically outperform the
market. The initial prices of all five securities are equal. Although all phones are
modeled closely after real product concepts and are competitively priced, one
might argue that it is easier to make a profitable trade early by buying low or
selling high. Such a trade is profitable for the trader andmoves prices in the right
direction.We define such a trade as “right”. On the other hand, a “wrong” trade
is one where a trader trades in a security that is already overvalued or sells a
security that is undervalued. In thefirst roundof trading,more than65percent of
trades are “right”. This is the highest proportion of right trades in any round. It is
still favorable in the second round, and by the third round, the proportion of right
trades is virtually equal to the proportion of wrong trades. One would expect to
see this behavior in an efficient market. Overall, 56% and 44% of trades
represent right and wrong trades respectively. This 12 percent differential
generates market prices which are substantially better than the deliberative
estimates. This confirms that a limited number of marginal traders or trades are
sufficient for efficient markets, leaving significant room for behavioral biases.
Althougheach trading session resulted in equilibrium, thefinalmarket prices
of eight trading groups sum tomore than $100 and only two groups close trading
below $100. Two of the eight groups overprice the bundle {A, B, C, D, E} by
more than ten percent. Thus, while traders could have made a riskless profit by
exploiting this arbitrageopportunity, theydidnot. In fact, eight of twelvemarkets
closed with an arbitrage opportunity. This phenomenon is not unusual. Rietz
(2005) has observed that state-contingentArrow-Debreu contracts, similar to the
shares used in this experiment, were consistently overpriced by 14.5 percent to
20 percent in laboratory markets with two securities that represented a bundle
of all possible outcomes.7
TABLE 4
Trading statistics and MAPE for the trading groups
Trading Group Trades Rounds Trades/Round Avg. Trades/Trader MAPE
1 129 7 18.4 4.6 5.6%
2 74 4 18.5 4.6 19.7%
3 155 9 17.2 4.3 17.5%
4 92 5 18.4 4.6 17.4%
5 60 4 15.0 3.8 10.3%
6 47 3 15.7 3.9 12.2%
7 79 5 15.8 4.0 24.9%
8 59 3 19.7 4.9 17.0%
9 93 6 15.5 3.9 17.1%
10 100 5 20.0 5.0 9.2%
11 55 3 18.3 4.6 18.5%
12 42 4 10.5 2.6 10.7%
Average 82.1 4.8 16.9 4.2 15.0%
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Taken together, our results indicate that there are a number of significant
biases in traders’ behavior. Performance and non-performance related trader
information can be used to draw conclusions about the traders’ preferences and
abilities. Despite these behavioral biases the markets are able to make
predictions that are better than most individuals and even group deliberations.
Thisunderscores the ability ofmarkets toovercomeandcorrect individual biases
effectively.
V. CONCLUSION
This study directly compares information markets and group delibera-
tions. Both prediction markets and group deliberations are subject to
numerous judgmental biases. A theoretical examination suggests that the
feedback mechanism provided by markets makes them better suited to correct
those biases. We argue that, in the case of information markets, average
accuracy alone is insufficient to appropriately measure predictive power. In a
direct comparison with other decision support tools, precision should also be
assessed to reach a more meaningful conclusion.
Our experimental design is straightforward. We provide small groups of
individuals with identical information and ask them to forecast market shares of
five competing cell phones.We then compare the output from businessmeetings
with that frominformationmarkets.Our results strongly indicate that information
markets provide more accurate and less volatile estimates than group
deliberations. However, both prediction markets and group deliberations are
subject to numerous judgmental biases. While some of these biases have been
found in other prediction markets, this study confirms their existence in the
context of new product introductions. We also confirm different sources of
behavioral biases in the two approaches. For example, Talkers can be led astray
by an influential group member while Traders tend to overweight purchases of
their favorite phone. Apparently the structure of information markets alleviates
Traders’ individualbiasesmore effectively resulting inmoreaccurateandprecise
forecasts.
Of course, prediction markets are subject to certain limitations and cannot
fully replace meetings, opinion polls or outside consultants. They do,
TABLE 5
Percentage of right and wrong trades per round
Cumulative Round 1 2 3 4 5 .5
Right 65.1% 61.7% 58.0% 60.7% 56.3% 56.0%
Wrong 34.9% 38.3% 42.0% 39.3% 43.7% 44.0%
Round by Round
Round 1 2 3 4 5 .5
Right 65.1% 58.4% 50.5% 51.3% 53.8% 53.5%
Wrong 34.9% 41.6% 49.5% 48.7% 46.2% 46.5%
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however, have considerable potential to supplement these traditional methods
used to collect and aggregate information. It is a promising field for further
research that needs to be tested outside of an experimental setting.
NOTES
1. There is a limited amount of research concerned with the direct theoretical comparison of prediction
markets and group deliberations. Sunstein (2006) is one example.
2. For a more comprehensive overview refer to Kahneman et al. (1982).
3. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), which generates behavior consistent with loss
aversion, but not overconfidence or regret, is one prominent example.
4. The original market board was invented by Robin Hanson who has used it for a limited number of
winner-take all markets where traders had to identify the culprit in a murder mystery. A number of
modifications to Hanson’s market board were made for this laboratory market. Prior to this experiment,
it had not been used in any formal study of information markets.
5. Appendix C contains results of individual and group estimates.
6. This analysis eliminates one extreme outlier. The most influential decision maker in one group had a
MAPE of 98 percent which was the worst individual estimate among all subjects. Obviously, the group
was able to correct this extremely conspicuous error.
7. Chen and Plott (2002) also observed that in all of their prediction market experiments at Hewlett-
Packard, prices violated the no-arbitrage conditions and summed to be greater than the winning payoff
(2002).
8. Questions 12 and 13 were posed orally after the group discussion. They asked subjects to identify the
most influential or most talkative (question 12) and the least influential or least talkative (question 13)
group members.
9. This is only a partial screenshot. Participants were able to scroll up and down and trade every price
between $0 and $100.
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